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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 1 8 1960

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In response to my request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided me with their views on the draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

I believe that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are forwarded herewith, will be of interest to you and to the other Disarmament Principals who are concerned with this problem.

Sincerely,


SIGNED
JAMES H. DOUGLAS

(ACTING

Inclosure
JCSM-236-60

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

CC to: Chairman, AEC
Director, CIA 
Special Asst to the President
For Science and Technology
Special Asst to the President
For National Security Affairs

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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JCS-236-66
13 JUL 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**Subject: Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance
of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)**

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests in accordance with your memorandum, dated 26 January 1966. Cognizance has also been taken of recent events such as the THRESHOLD proposal, made by the United States during February, and subsequent related actions.
2. Specific comments on the treaty itself, to include inspection and control aspects and the estimated installation and operating costs of the control system, are contained in the Appendix hereto.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their views on 21 August 1959, in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, that an adequate military posture for the United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons compatible with modern delivery systems which will make it possible to apply selectively adequate force against any threat. It is recognized that if an enforceable test ban agreement is concluded and implemented the United States will not achieve such a spectrum of weapons. However, a nuclear test ban treaty which would guarantee a cessation of testing by the Sino-Soviets as well as the United States could theoretically be to the relative U.S. military advantage. The present estimated preponderance of the U.S. stockpile relative to that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the current U.S. lead in sophistication of nuclear weapon systems are factors which, if taken in isolation, could justify U.S. acceptance of an enforceable test ban from a security standpoint. Unless a test ban treaty could guarantee a cessation of testing in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, with its resultant effect on Soviet weapons and stockpile development, further U.S. testing for sophistication of the components of various existing weapon systems as well as basic development of new weapons is deemed vital. The anti-missile missile is not the least of this latter category.

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4. The recent trend of the Geneva test ban negotiations offers little hope for a treaty that would ensure a cessation of testing in the closed society of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. An inadequately safeguarded treaty, however, would be self-enforcing in the open societies of the West. The introduction of the U.S. THRESHOLD proposal with its attendant moratorium and inadequate detection, inspection and control system justifies reiteration and re-emphasis of the dangers of such an unsafeguarded agreement to the security of the United States.

5. The conclusion of a treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests without adequate safeguards would set a dangerous precedent for the Ten Nation negotiations, particularly in respect to the proposal for curtailment of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, phased reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles and eventual elimination of the use of nuclear weapons. For the past decade, the Soviets have pressed for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, consequently, there will be a tendency to equate a nuclear weapons test ban with a ban on their use. This point the Sino-Soviet Bloc would undoubtedly pursue to the maximum in an effort to offset our present nuclear advantage.

6. Acceptance of the presently proposed test ban treaty, the provisions of which do not provide for adequate safeguards, would establish a dangerous precedent for the Ten Nation negotiations and would make it increasingly difficult to insist on adequate control for the above mentioned nuclear arms measures which have already been tabled. The historical U.S. position of insistence upon adequate safeguards (required by Basic National Security Policy) appears to be deteriorating rapidly in the interest of reaching an agreement. Although the decision to announce a unilateral moratorium below the THRESHOLD has already been made public, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a technical analysis and experimental verification on the effectiveness of the proposed control and inspection system should be made and the results evaluated before any moratorium is actually implemented. The fact that prominent and patriotic U.S. scientists insist that a proper inspection and control is impossible due to difficulties in the high altitude and underground environment is, in itself, good reason to require that such an analysis be made. The decision on a unilateral moratorium below the THRESHOLD was based primarily on political considerations which in no way removes technical difficulties involved in developing an effective control and inspection system in high altitude and underground environments.

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7. As previously stated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it essential to the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent to periodically detonate weapons to test systems and techniques for the employment of nuclear weapons to ensure operational reliability, and to further sophisticate weapon systems. Unless a safeguarded treaty could ensure a cessation of testing by the closed society of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, these requirements must be fulfilled continuously in order to provide for the security of the United States. The most important matter of concern now, however, is the apparent movement of the United States away from a safeguarded treaty to one of "good faith" while it has always been the Soviet approach. A prolonged moratorium without satisfactory development of a reliable control system achieves essentially the same results for the Soviets as an agreed and ratified treaty. Any test cessation agreement accepted on faith alone gives the Sino-Soviet Bloc, with its closed society, an advantage in altering the present military posture ratio. As such, it would be militarily undesirable to the United States. The frustration of the U.N. Peace team in Korea is an example of the danger of accepting the principle of agreement on good faith with the hope of working out the details of control during the implementation of an agreement.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

H. F. TWING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (4 pages)

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
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21 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on JCS Views on Draft Treaty
on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons
Tests, 13 June 1960

1. This is for information only.
2. The JCS comments are to a large extent a reiteration of the usual Defense objections to a treaty on this subject which does not provide absolute guarantees against renewed Soviet testing. Since it will probably never be possible to obtain such a guarantee, it is unlikely that the JCS will ever be happy with any treaty. The important factor is to have the control system sufficiently good that, when combined with our unilateral intelligence systems, it will deter the Soviets from risking a clandestine test. Furthermore, the risk to U.S. security of a clandestine Soviet test must be balanced against the risks of a continued arms race and the positive value that such a treaty with its inspection provisions might have to U.S. security.
3. It should be noted that in paragraph 6 the Joint Chiefs' object to a unilateral moratorium below the threshold although this has been approved by the President. They fail to take into consideration that we already are in a period of a unilateral moratorium without having obtained any of the benefits which a treaty would provide.


/HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

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cc: DDCI
DD/I

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Remarks:

Pete:

The boss has asked for your comment on the attached by late this afternoon -- he is meeting with the Joint Chiefs tomorrow and feels this might be raised.



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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

EO/DCI/ [] blp

21 Jul 60

FORM NO. 237
1 APR 55

Replaces Form 30-4
which may be used.